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Learning the Hard Way: Quality, Safety and Scandal
Patient safety, ethics and whistleblowing: a nursing
response to the events at the Campbelltown and
Camden Hospitals
Megan-Jane Johnstone
IN NOVEMBER 2002, in what stands as one of the
most significant whistleblowing cases in the his-
tory of the Australian health care system, four
nurses went public with concerns they had about
the management of clinical incidents and patient
safety at two hospitals in Sydney, New South
Wales. The handling of this case and its aftermath
raises important moral questions concerning the
nature of whistleblowing in health care domains
and the possible implications for the patient
safety and quality of care movement in Australia.
This paper presents an overview of the case, the
moral risks associated with whistleblowing, and
some lessons learned.
The International Council of Nurses (2000)
Code of Ethics stipulates that nurses have a
stringent responsibility to "take appropriate
action to safeguard individuals when their care is
endangered by a eo-worker or any other person".
Other local and international nursing codes of
ethics and standards of professional conduct like-
wise obligate nurses to take appropriate action to
safeguard individuals when placed at risk by the
incompetent, unethical or illegal acts of others -
including the system. Despite these coded moral
prescriptions for responsible and accountable
professional conduct, taking appropriate action
when others are placed at risk (including making
reports to appropriate authorities) is never an
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easy task nor is it free of risk for nurses. As has"
been amply demonstrated in the literature, taking
a moral stance to protect patient safety and
quality of care can be extremely hazardous to
nurses (johnstone 1994, 2002, 2004; Ahern &
McDonald 2002). In situations where nurses
report their concerns to an appropriate authority
but nothing is done to either investigate or vali-
date their claims, nurses are faced with the ethical
dilemma and 'choice' of whether to: do nothing
('put up and shut up'); leave their current place of
employment (and possibly even the profession); or
take the matter further ('blow the whistle') by
reporting their concerns to an external authority
that they perceive as having the power to do
something about their concerns.
It is rare for nurses to 'blow the whistle' in the
public domain. When they do, it is usually
because they perceive that something is terribly
wrongand, asa matter of conscience, theycannot
just look on as morally passive bystanders. For
those nurses who do take a stand, the costs to
them personally and professionally are almost
always devastating, with no guarantees that the
situation on which they have taken a public
stance will be improved. Nurses who blow the
whistle often end up with their careers and lives
in tatters (see case studies in ]ohnstone 1994 &
2004).
The Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals case
(discussed below) is a rare event. Publicity sur-
rounding the case has had dire consequences for
many people, including the nurses who went
public with their concerns. However, the case has
also provided an unprecedented opportunity to
examine the relationship (some might say, ten-
sion) between whistleblowing and clinical risk
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management, and the processes that might be
used by nurses and others to promote patient
safety and quality of care in highly politicised
environments.
This anicle focuses on the broader issues raised
by this case, addressing what constitutes whistle-
blowing, the conditions under which nurses
might decide to blow the whistle, the moral risks
of whistleblowing, and why whistle blowing
ought to be considered only as a last reson. The
ultimate conclusion of this paper is that, contrary
to some of the pessimistic views expressed about
this case, it has provided a valuable opportunity
for lessons to be learned and underscores the
pressing moral imperative for establishing what
Liang (2001) describes as a "non-punitive, coop-
erative environment that focuses on systems, not
individuals, to reduceerrors". Inorderto advance
this discussion, however, some background infor-
mation on the case is warranted.
Background to the case
In November 2002, four nurses reponed to the
then Minister for Health (NSW) concerns they
had about the management of clinical incidents
and patient safety at two main health care facili-
ties of the Macanhur Health Service (MHS),
notably the Campbelltown and Camden Hospi-
tals, located within the South Western Sydney
Area Health Service (SWSAHS). The nurses' con-
cerns were echoed later by three more nurses who
also came forward with allegations about mis-
management and patient neglect at the hospitals.
As a result of these nurses' repons, a formal
complaint involving 68 individual incidents was
referred by the Director-General of NSW Health
to the States Health Care Complaints Commis-
sion (HCCC) for funher investigation. Thineen
months later, in December 2003, the HCCC
released the long-awaited report on its investiga-
tion (Health Care Complaints Commission 2003;
Walker 2004a).
Of the total number (68) of incidents referred
to the HCCC, only 48 clinical incidents that
occurred between June 1999 and February 2003
were formally investigated (Walker 2004a).
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Nonetheless, the HCCC findings supported sub-
stantively the allegations made by the nurses
regarding "the variable standards of patient care
and safety at both hospitals" (Holland 2004). The
HCCC repon was highly critical of the MHS and
SWSAHS, describing their responses to the
HCCC investigation as "defensive" and as "indica-
tive of the organisations culture and the lack of
openness in dealing with reponed concerns about
the safe care and treatment of patients" (Health
Care Complaints Commission 2003, p.ii). The
HCCC was particularly critical of the MHS
response to the nurses, stating that:
They [management] did not hear the mes-
sage from the nurse informants about the
safe careand treatment of patients.They did
not hear the message from the nurse inform-
ants at the time of its original sending, at its
first airing in the public media, nor during
the course of most of this investigation
(Health CareComplaints Commission 2003,
p. ii).
The release of the HCCC repon was not with-
Oul controversy. or panicular concern to its
critics was that the repon "did not go far enough"
in that it failed to find any individuals account-
able for the incidents investigated and had failed
to refer any doctors or nurses to the relevant
regulating authorities (eg, the NSW Medical
Board and NSW Nurses Board) for funher inves-
tigation and possible disciplinary action. In
response to this perceived failure (and in the
aftermath of what could be described as a very
public 'baying for blood' in the media) the NSW
government terminated the employment of the
Health Care Complaints Commissioner and set
up an independent Special Commission of
Inquiry (Commission) into Campbelltown and
Camden Hospitals (Walker 2004a,b,c,d,e,O.
Under its terms of reference, the Commission
(headed by Bret Walker SC) was to investigate
funher the matters at hand and, where indicated
by the Commissions findings, to also make "refer-
ral of any matter to any other person or body for
prosecution or disciplinary or other investigative
action" (Lawlink NSW 2004).
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During the course of the Commissions hear-
ings, eight 'informant nurses' were interviewed,
with one of these nurses being interviewed over
a number of sessions. At the time of the release
of the first Interim Report of the Special Com-
mission, 25 hours of interviews had been con-
ducted with the nurses, generating over 500
pages of transcripts (Walker 2004a, p. 20). In
the Commission's Second Interim Report, rec-
ommendations were made that in 24 incidents,
15 doctors and at least II nurses should be
investigated by the HCCC, and that seven doc-
tors should have their performance assessed by
the NSW Medical Board (Walker 2004b, p. 4). It
is anticipated that some nurses will also be
referred to the NSW Nurses Board to have their
performance assessed.
What is whistleblowing?
Whistleblowing broadly involves "the intersec-
tion of two phenomena: principled organisational
dissent, and public interest disclosure" (Keyes 1993,
p.26). Whistleblowing may be defined as:
The voluntary release of non-public infor-
mation, as a moral protest, by a member or
former member of an organization outside
the normal channels ofcommunication toan
appropriate audience about illegal and/or
immoral conduct in the organization or con-
duct in the organization that is opposed in
some significant way to the public imerest
(Boatright 1993, p. 133).
Although there are no universally agreed cri-
teria of what constitutes an act of whistleblowing,
there is some acceptance in the literature that the
followingconditions must be met:
• an individual performs an (unauthorised)
action or series of actions intended to make
information public;
• the information is made a matter of public
record;
• the information is about possible or actual,
non-trivial wrongdoing in an organization;
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• the individual who performs the action is a
member or former member of the organization
(Vinten 1994, pp. 256-7).
Some contend that whistleblowing reports are
also usually made to a person in a position of
authority (ie, with the power to stop the wrong),
or to some other entity which, if not having the
direct power to stop the wrong, nevertheless is
perceived to have the capacity to exert pressure
on those who do have the power to stop the
wrong - for example, the media (Rosen 1999).
As has been discussed elsewhere (lohnstone
2004), a key reason people resort to whistle-
blowing is to cause other people to pay attention
and take action immediately. Like the siren or
fire alarm, the sound of the 'whistleblower' seeks
to alert people immediately to the fact "that
something is either happening or is about to
happen [and] there is a need to pay attention"
(Erlen 1999, p. 67).
Processes influencing whistleblowing
by nurses
As suggested earlier, it is rare for nurses to
'blow the whistle' outside of their employer
organisations. Furthermore. there is some evi-
dence to suggest that nurses generally are
reluctant reporters. For example, in a recent
report of a Scottish study on whistleblowing by
nurses, it was revealed that 60% of the nurses
surveyed "felt unable to report poor patient
care, with 42% of these nurses fearing retribu-
tion if they did" (Nursing Standard 2004).
North American studies on peer reporting of
eo-worker wrongdoing likewise suggest that
nurses are reluctant to report (Lawton & Parker
2002; King & Hermodson 2000; King 2001).
When 'pushed' beyond reasonable limits, how-
ever, nurses will take a stand - including
reporting their concerns to a higher authority
outside of their employer organisation (john-
stone 2002, 2004). According to one North
American study, the processes most likely to
influence a nurse's decision to report wrongdo-
ing and risks include:
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• individual characteristics (such as personal and
professional ethics);
• situational factors (such as a the intentions of
the wrongdoer and the severity of the wrong-
doing);
• organisational issues (such as compliance or
non-compliance with policy and procedures)
(King & Hermodson 2000; King 2001).
There is no question that upon encountering a
situation in which the safety of patients is at risk
nurses and others ought to take appropriate
action to have the situation remedied. The ques-
tion here is not whether action should be taken,
but rather what hind of action should be taken
and whether whistleblowing is an effectivemeans
of remedying the status quo.
Whistleblowing as a last resort
Whistleblowing aimed at protecting innocent oth-
ers may be strongly warranted on moral grounds.
Nonetheless, there is much to suggest that whistle-
blowing should only ever be considered after all
other avenues have been exhausted in an attempt
to remedy the situation (johnstone 2004). There
are at least two reasons for this. First, whistleblow-
ing is never without risks - either to the whistle-
blower or, ironically, to the very people that a
whistleblowing act was supposedly motivated to
protect. This is because once a repon has been
made public the whistleblower has no control over
how it will be interpreted or used in the public
domain. Second, even though it draws needed
public attention to a serious concern, an act of
whistleblowing may still not result in the situation
being improved. In summary, whistleblowing is
not without Significant moral costs that must be
weighed up against the possible moral benefits.
Thus, even when going public is morally justified,
there are no guarantees that it will achieve morally
desirable outcomes.
The risks of whistleblowing
Whistleblowing can be an extremely traumatic
(and costly) method of putting to right a wrong.
As has been argued elsewhere:
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Rather than seeing a whistleblowers repon
asan opportunity to improve thesystemand
protect those whose interests have been
placed at risk by questionable practices. an
organisation whose conditions have been
exposed may take a defensive stance and
seek, instead, to protect itself (Iohnstone
2004, p. 355).
Whistleblowing, by its very nature, upsets the
status quo and accordingly is commonly. per-
ceived as 'rocking the boat' (Erlen 1999). In
Australia, it might be viewed in the more collo-
quial terms of 'dobbing in a mate'. Thus, even
though a nurse might have done the right thing,
whistleblowing can nevenheless result in him or
her being portrayed as a disloyal troublemaker
and stigmatised and shunned accordingly (Erlen
1999; Rosen 1999). Employers and eo-workers
may retaliate by trying to discredit whistleblow-
ing nurses, intimidating them by overly scrutinis-
ing the standards of their practice, threatening to
terminate or actually terminating their jobs, and
taking legal action against them for defamation
(Iohnstone 2004).
In the MHS case, in an attempt to discredit the
nurses, one notable television current affairs pro-
gram claimed that it had evidence that the "public
had been duped" on account of it "never being
told the whole story" by the nurses and that it
would now "blow the whistle on the whistle
blowers" (Davis 2004). During the program, alle-
gations were levelled at one of the nurses that,
contrary to her claims, she had failed to raise any
issues of concern with a relevant clinical care
committee of which she had been a member for
four years (Davis 2004). In support of his allega-
tions, the reponer cited-the minutes of the com-
mittee in question, which he claimed contained
no record of the nurse raising any concerns. The
nurse contested the reporters claims, explaining
that the "minutes are not a true reflection of what
happened at those meetings". The reporter did
not accept this explanation, however, and charac-
terised the nurse as being an unreliable member
of the committee (Davis 2004).
Whistleblowing nurses can suffer serious health
problems as a result of their experience. In a small
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but important study on the physical and emo-
tional effects of whistleblowing McDonald (2002)
found that, as a result of blowing the whistle on
misconduct in the workplace, the majority of the
nurses surveyed suffered from significant physical
and emotional health problems (70% and 94%,
respectively), including lethargy, sleep distur-
bances, headaches, backaches, weight loss or
gain, increased substance use (eg, drugs and
alcohol intake, smoking), gastrointestinal prob-
lems, cardiac symptoms, anger, anxiety, depres-
sion, disillusionment, fear, poor self-esteem, and
a breakdown of personal relationships (including
separation and divorce).
It is important to acknowledge that whistle-
blowing nurses might not be the only casualties
of their reports. Others might also be devastated
by a whistleblowing act, and in ways not envis-
aged or desired by the whistleblowers. For
example, following the release of the HCCC
report, the entire SWSAHS Board was dismissed,
the incumbent Health Care Complaints Com-
missioner was terminated from her position, the
former general manager of the MHS was termi-
nated from a new appointment which she had
not yet taken up, and 15 doctors and 11 nurses
were referred for further investigation (Holland
2004; Walker 2004a, 2004b). As well, staff who
continued to work at the health service have
reported verbal and physical abuse after reports
were made public. In one report it was claimed
that staff had been "spat at" and "treated like
lepers" and that their children had been "treated
appallingly" at school because it was known that
their "parents [were] nurses and doctors" (Col-
lins, in Davis 2004, p.9; see also Cassidy &: Vale
2003).
There were also media reports claiming that
medical negligence cases had "jumped over the
past six months amid allegations of wrongful
deaths in top Sydney hospitals", with one Syd-
ney law firm claiming a fivefold increase in
reports from clients (Morello 2004). Figures
presented to the Commission, however, were
more circumspect. One respondent indicated
that for the 12 month period ending June 2002
there were just 42 statements of claims before
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the Supreme Court, and for the year ending June
2003 there were 62 cases and that these figures,
while demonstrating an increase in claims, were
"hardly a watershed of cases" (Reid, in Walker
2004f, p. 229).
Arguably one of the most undesirable risks
associated with whistleblowing is the impact that
its publicity might have on the public's trust in
the health service on which it is otherwise
dependent for care and from which it might turn
away, even in moments that are life threatening."
This risk is exemplified by the comments of Peter
Bentley, whose wife died after surgery at Camp-
belltown Hospital (a case not part of the enquiry),
Speaking before the Commission (forum held 8
June, 2004), Bentley responded:
I live in Campbelltown with my daughter
and my grand-daughter. I'm 65. It is quite
possible I could have a heart attack tomor-
row or next week. Mydaughter willnot take
me to Campbelltown Hospital. It might cost
me my life, but I told her, "Don't take me
over there." My grand-daughter was asked
once - a friend of hers fell over and broke
her ann. "You are going to have to go to
hospital." My grand-daughter, who had just
turned II, said, "Don'tgo to Campbelltown
Hospital. They killedmy nanny" (Bentley, in
Walker 2004f, p.254).
Lessons learned
There is fear among some in the health care sector
that the handling of this case has set the quality
agenda back many years, with one commentary
published in the MedicalJoumal ofAustralia warn-
ing: "Be very afraid. The precedent is set - blame
is back on the agenda" (Frankum et aI. 2004).
Others, however, have been more measured in
their responses, with one commentator reflecting
that an important lesson learned is that "for our
hospitals, there is more to quality than rhetoric"
(Van Der Weyden 2004a, p. 101). In a later
commentary, this same author pleaded:
Our public hospitals are 19th-century insti-
tutions at sea in the 21st century, and they
need reform We desperately need an
17
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open, blameless and depoliticised environ-
ment which allows individuals to speak
frankly about individual or systemic short-
falls and failures, and clear pathways for
these to be addressed (Van Der Weyden
2004b, p. 365).
In her 1993 Clinton (Presidential) Inaugura-
tion poem The rock cries out to us today, the Black
American writer MayaAngelou reminds us:
History, despite its wrecking pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced with courage,
Need not be lived again. (Angelou 1993)
We cannot 'unlive' the NSW case, but we can
face it with courage. It is understandable that
some might feel that the events surrounding the
MHS case have undermined the very good work
that has been done in recent years to improve
patient safety and quality of care in Australia.
However, there are also considerable grounds for
asserting that the case has, in fact, underscored
rather than undermined the imperatives of effec-
tive clinical governance and clinical risk manage-
ment in health care. More specifically, as stated
earlier, it has emphasised the critical need and
moral imperative for a non-punitive, cooperative
environment that focuses on systems, not individ-
uals, to reduce errors, and for such an approach
to be supported not only in the health care arena
but, importantly, in the political and legal arenas
as well (Liang 2001).
Conclusion
Australia is currently experiencing what is prob-
ably one of the biggest cultural changes ever in
its health care system and in the public arena
where it is situated. This change involves a
profound shift from a culture of blame to a
culture of lessons learned, and from individual
accountability to system accountability. Argua-
bly, there is an even bigger cultural change still
to come, notably in the political and legal
cultures whose modus operandi is one of 'nam-
ing, blaming and shaming' and of seeking retri-
bution, rather than restoration for the wrongs
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that have been done. Once these cultures begin
to change, then the patient safety movement will
have a real chance of succeeding. While chang-
ing these cultures may be difficult, it is not
impossible. As the African restorative justice
approach (commonly referred to as the 'third
way') taken by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa has so poignantly
demonstrated to the world, it is possible to find
out the truth, heal breaches, redress imbalances,
restore broken relationships, and rehabilitate
both victims and perpetrators injured by an
offence without resorting to a system of retribu-
tive justice (Tutu 1999). Arguably, the MHS case
has provided a timely opportunity for us all to
reflect on this lesson.
As for the nurses (and others) who are still left
wondering what they should do and where they
should go when finding themselves in environ-
ments where patient safety is at risk, the message
is clear: despite the risks involved, they must take
a stance, since unless they do, things will not
change. The system and those responsible for its
management must ensure that a culture of safety
is actively promulgated in health care domains,
and that staffwho have concerns have somewhere
safe to go to have their concerns heard and
redressed in a constructive manner.
The opportunity to 'make a difference' has,
perhaps, never been greater. By working collec-
tively, collaboratively and conscientiously to
change the cultures of the systemsin which we are
all so embedded, and to operationalise effective
quality and risk management programs in our
hospitals (see Wilson in this issue, page 20),
hopefully conscientious health care staff will have
real opportunities to contribute to improving qual-
ity and safety in health care domains without
resorting to blowing the whistle.
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